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INTRODUCTION
Responding to a white policeman’s shooting of a black teenager, Reverend Jesse Jackson 
said that the United States was in a “national crisis.”1 That was in 1990. Jackson’s concern was as 
pertinent over twenty years before that2 as it is today, nearly thirty years later.3 Calls for change in 
                                                                  
* Harvard Law School, J.D., Class of 2017; Harvard Kennedy School, M.P.P., Class of 2017. I gratefully acknowledge 
Professors David Harris and Philip Heymann for overseeing the course during which I first drafted this article. Thanks also 
to Roy Austin and Steve Ryals for their feedback and support, and to the team at the Journal of Law and Social Change
for their helpful edits. 
1  Andrew H. Malcolm, Change in Enforcement Is Said to Cut Violence Between Police and Public, N.Y.
TIMES, (Sept. 2, 1990), https://perma.cc/R2Z8-4Y9X. 
2 See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 8 (1968), 
https://perma.cc/WE9V-56R8 (“The abrasive relationship between the police and the minority communities has been a 
major—and explosive—source of grievance, tension, and disorder. The blame must be shared by the total society.”); see
also SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 11 (2005) (discussing the apparent stagnancy 
since the “strife-torn decade of the 1960s,” as well as the steps that police departments have taken internally to curb 
misconduct since then). 
3 See, e.g., Eric Bradner, Lawmakers Say Tensions Between Police, African-American Communities Aren't 
Going Away Soon, CNN (May 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/XAW7-DXLX (“All told, the situation has become a national 
crisis, House Speaker John Boehner said Sunday.”); Colin Campbell, Al Sharpton: “We Are Dealing With A National 
Crisis” of Police Violence, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 3, 2014), https://perma.cc/F4SE-AUED; Edward-Isaac Dovere, White 
House Awakes to “National Crisis,” POLITICO (Apr. 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/8V7T-8S4Q. 
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policing tactics in the United States have echoed through the decades, inspiring numerous studies, 
books, and proposals for “organizational change.”4 Countless attempts to implement seemingly 
promising reforms have been tried and abandoned.5 The U.S. Department of Justice has 
incorporated “best practices” from police departments around the country into settlements 
designed to curb civil rights violations and improve policing practices.6 Yet in the 2010s, as 
stories of the deaths of unarmed black citizens at the hands of police have commanded national 
headlines and brought protesters to the streets in Baltimore, Ferguson, New York, and elsewhere,7
the Reverend’s words continue to resonate. This should come as no surprise, given studies 
showing that police culture and value orientations changed little during this period.8 As Samuel 
Walker laments in his chronicle of “the new police accountability”: 
The history of police reform is filled with stories of highly publicized changes 
that promised much but evaporated over the long run with only minimal 
impact . . . .  Many cynics believe that the American police are incapable of 
reforming themselves and that the police subculture is resistant to all efforts to 
achieve accountability. Regrettably, a review of police history lends an 
uncomfortable amount of support to this very pessimistic view.9
                                                                  
4 See MALCOLM D. HOLMES & BRAD W. SMITH, RACE AND POLICE BRUTALITY: ROOTS OF AN URBAN
DILEMMA 23-24, 138-41 (2008). 
5 See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 2 at 178-79. 
6 See, e.g., id. at 5, 18. 
7 See, e.g., Daniel Funke & Tina Susman, From Ferguson to Baton Rouge: Deaths of Black Men and 
Women at the Hands of Police (July 12, 2016), L.A. Times, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-police-deaths-20160707-
snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/24S8-6LBN]; Chicago Dashcam Video Shows Police Killing of Laquan McDonald 
– Video, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2015, 7:52 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2015/nov/24/chicago-
officials-release-video-showing-police-killing-of-laquan-mcdonald-video [https://perma.cc/5JV2-85VY]; Kim Severson, 
Asking for Help, Then Killed by an Officer’s Barrage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/ 
us/asking-for-help-then-killed-by-an-officers-barrage.html?action=click&contentCollection=U.S.&module=Related
Coverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article [https://perma.cc/28NZ-PUZY]; Niraj Chokshi, Keith Lamont Scott Was 
Killed by Two Gunshot Wounds, Family Autopsy Finds, N.Y. Times (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/10/13/us/keith-lamont-scott-was-killed-by-two-gunshot-wounds-family-autopsy-finds.html [https://perma.cc/Q9L9-
QKE3]; see also Julia Craven, More Than 250 Black People Were Killed By Police In 2016 [Updated],
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/black-people-killed-by-police-america_us_577da633e4b0c590f7e7fb17
[https://perma.cc/J632-UVB6] HUFF. PO. (July 7, 2016, 9:45 AM, updated Jan. 1, 2017), Police Killed More Than 100 
Unarmed Black People in 2015, Mapping Police Violence, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/unarmed/ 
[https://perma.cc/8P4E-RX7B], 2014 Unarmed Victims, Mapping Police Violence, https://mappingpoliceviolence. 
org/unarmed2014/ [https://perma.cc/7B5S-Q8MJ]. Cf. also Fatal Force (2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/national/police-shootings-2017/ [https://perma.cc/F7GV-D9K2], Fatal Force (2016), WASH. POST, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016/, 991 People Shot Dead by police in 2015, WASH.
POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/JVT2-P84W]. 
8 See, e.g., Jihong Zhao et al., Individual Value Preferences Among American Police Officers: The Rokeach 
Theory of Human Values Revisited, 21 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGY. & MGMT. 22, 32 (1998) (finding little 
evidence of substantive change in the prevailing value orientations among police officers since their study over twenty 
years prior). But cf. Timothy Williams, Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-escalate, N.Y. TIMES (June 
27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/long-taught-to-use-force-police-warily-learn-to-de-escalate.html
[https://perma.cc/L35D-8BBB] (noting that police departments nationwide “are rethinking notions of policing that have 
held sway for 40 years, making major changes to how officers are trained in even the most quotidian parts of their work”). 
9 See WALKER, supra note 2, at 17. 
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In other words: change is hard. Even with desire, urgency, and clear instructions on how 
to change, many fail.10 Yet not all change efforts are doomed. To the extent that efforts to change 
policy or practice can shift organizational culture to one more accepting of such changes, 
resistance can be minimized.11 But how to change organizational culture?
Studies show that people can evolve and, when they do, their evolution happens in a 
patterned and replicable way.12 Organizations, which are created, directed, and made up of 
people,13 are no different. Indeed, organizational psychology and change-management theory—
embraced in the business sector—shed light on what would be necessary to create the conditions 
for more lasting change in policing.14 This article makes the case for employing such an approach. 
After first describing the gap between policing culture today and the “guardian” culture described 
as ideal by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, it will summarize failed efforts to 
change police forces in that direction and then apply a useful frame from organizational 
psychology to demonstrate how to overcome resistance to change and move towards a future 
without law enforcement use of unnecessary force.15
I. FROM WARRIORS TO GUARDIANS 
A. Policing Culture Today
In a nation with over 18,000 individual law enforcement agencies, where policing is 
primarily locally controlled,16 there is no unilateral police culture.17 However, multiple studies 
                                                                  
10  ROBERT KEGAN & LISA LASKOW LAHEY, IMMUNITY TO CHANGE: HOW TO OVERCOME IT AND UNLOCK
THE POTENTIAL IN YOURSELF AND YOUR ORGANIZATION 1 (2009) (describing a study finding that only one in seven heart 
patients who are warned that they will likely die if they fail to make changes to their diet, exercise, and other habits are 
able to make the change crucial to their survival). 
11 See, e.g., Ali Dani man, Good Intentions and Failed Implementations: Understanding Culture-Based 
Resistance to Organizational Change, 19 EUR. J. WORK & ORG. PSYCH. 200, 201 (2010) (noting that organizational 
culture is the “root” of resistance to change (citing E. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP (1992))).
12 See KEGAN & LAHEY, supra note 10, at x. 
13 See MICHAEL A. DIAMOND & SETH ALLCORN, PRIVATE SELVES IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS: THE
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGNOSIS AND CHANGE ix (2009) (“[Organizations] are objectively, 
subjectively, and intersubjectively conceived relational systems existing inside and outside the human mind.”). 
14 See Jihong Zhao et al., Value Change Among Police Officers at a Time of Organizational Reform: A 
Follow-Up Study Using Rokeach Values, 22 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGY & MGMT. 152, 153 (1999) (“The most 
widely read and discussed scholarship on [community-oriented policing] suggests that the successful institutionalization of 
the community policing philosophy depends primarily on the achievement of a permanent change in the organizational 
culture and value orientations of individual police employees and their supervisors[,]” (citing M. A. Wycoff & W. Skogan, 
Community Policing in Madison: An Analysis of Implementation of Impact, in THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY
POLICING: TESTING THE PROMISES 75 (Dennis P. Rosenbaum ed., 1994); G. Kelling & M. Moore, From Political to 
Reform to Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 3-25 (J. 
Greene, J. & S. Mastrofski eds., 1988))). 
15 See generally POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE (March 2016), 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/guidingprinciples1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CWH-EUX4]. 
16  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (“TASK FORCE”), OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED
POLICING SERVS., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 29 (2015); see also 
Nicholas Haysom, Policing the Police: A Comparative Study of Control Mechanisms, 1989 ACTA JURIDICA 139, 159 
(1989) (describing the “multiplicity” of police departments in the U.S., and concluding “the diversity of police forces leads 
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indicate that, in general, there is a set of “values and beliefs unique to the police organization that 
challenge and resist . . . change[.]”18 Though many officers enter law enforcement with the 
intention of helping others,19 policing is demanding and hierarchical, contributing to the challenge 
many departments face in recruiting and retaining officers.20 Officers often face significant danger 
in the line of duty, including threats to their lives.21 This reality, and a number of other factors,22
contribute to the cultivation—at least in some departments—of what some scholars have 
described as an us versus-them tone,23 or “warrior mindset.”24 The words of one Oakland police 
officer, who said he was “sick and tired of taking things from the ‘animals and social misfits’ he 
found on the street . . . [and] that he actually looks forward to when a person makes that [sic] error 
                                                                  
to an equally diverse range of models for policing style” and therefore “comments on police in the United States tend to be 
unhelpful generalizations”). 
17  Culture is the “characteristic rhythm[s], shape, and feel” of an organization. DIAMOND & ALLCORN,
supra note 13, at 31; see also Dani man, supra note 11, at 214 (defining culture as a “set of understandings”). 
18 See Yusuf Yuksel, Organizational Change: The Case of the New York Police Department, 11 EUR. SCI.
J. 428, 428 (May 2015) (citing J. Wood, Cultural Change in the Governance of Security, 14 POLICING & SOC’Y 31 (2004), 
Janet Chan, Changing Police Culture, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1996), J. C. BARKER, DANGER, DUTY, AND 
DISILLUSION (1999), J. Van Maanen, Breaking In: A Consideration of Organizational Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF 
WORK, ORGANIZATION, AND SOCIETY (R. Dubin ed., 1975), PETER K. MANNING, POLICE WORK: THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF POLICING (1977), F. Siegel, Community policing, Chicago style by Wesley G. Skogan & Susan M. 
Hartnett, reviewing TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC, PUBLIC INTEREST 117
(1999)). For a brief review of the scholarship on whether there is indeed a subculture of policing, and what characteristics 
that subculture has, see Michael D. White et al., Motivations for Becoming a Police Officer: Re-assessing Officer Attitudes 
and Job Satisfaction After Six Years on the Street, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 520, 527 (2010). 
19 See generally White et al., supra note 18.
20 See generally Jeremy M. Wilson et al., Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium: The 
State of Knowledge, RAND Ctr. On Quality Policing (2010), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG959.html. 
21 See, e.g., Officer Down Memorial Page, https://www.odmp.org/ [https://perma.cc/4U2E-HJSN]. 
22  Some studies suggest that the profession attracts individuals with authoritarian mentalities. See White et 
al., supra note 18, at 521, 526. 
23 See, e.g., Steve Herbert, Police Subculture Reconsidered, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 343, 343 (1998) (“Several 
authors emphasize the prevailing sense of rupture that officers believe exists between them and the general public, a 
‘we/they’ mentality that courses through the police’s social world.”) (citing VICTOR KAPPELER ET AL., FORCES OF 
DEVIANCE: UNDERSTANDING THE DARK SIDE OF POLICING (1994), ARTHUR NIEDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD: THE
POLICE IN URBAN SOCIETY 175 (1967), JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966), and W. A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW,
CUSTOM, AND MORALITY xiii (1970)); Robert W. Benson, Changing Police Culture: The Sine Qua Non of Reform, 34 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 681, 687-90 (2000-2001) (discussing the roots and characteristics of police militarization); RADLEY
BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013); see also, e.g., Nick 
Pinto, When Cops Break Bad: Inside a Police Force Gone Wild, ROLLING STONE, Jan. 29, 2015, https://perma.cc/5YBD-
7DU8 (discussing militarization of Albuquerque police). See generally JEROME H. SKOLNIK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE 
LAW (1993); VICTOR E. KAPPELER ET AL., FORCES OF DEVIANCE: UNDERSTANDING THE DARK SIDE OF POLICING (1998).
24 See TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 1, 11; Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 
HARV. L. REV. F. 225 (Apr. 10, 2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/04/law-enforcements-warrior-problem/
[https://perma.cc/7LLZ-GU2X]; Joshua Holland, Are We Training Cops to Be Hyper-Aggressive ‘Warriors’?, THE
NATION (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/are-we-training-cops-to-be-hyper-aggressive-warriors/
[https://perma.cc/GTW3-L9S9]; cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2 (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ 
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWH6-3Z3V] (describing and problematizing policing culture 
focused on citizens as potential revenue generators rather than “constituents to be protected”). 
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that is serious enough for him to make an arrest[,]”25 exemplify an extreme version of this 
mindset.26 This mentality may result in a tendency to escalate conflict,27 or to employ arrest as the 
“preferred solution for any minor problem.”28
Beyond the us-versus-them mentality, scholars have described “a cultural milieu that 
tolerates or even facilitates illegal practices,”29 including the use of excessive force beyond that 
which is “objectively reasonable” to repel a deadly threat.30 In some departments, use of excessive 
force, which disproportionately affects people of color, particularly black Americans,31 along with 
other forms of misconduct,32 may not only unpunished, but be condoned as necessary.33 The 
Department of Justice reports on the Baltimore and Chicago Police Departments document  
                                                                  
25 Id. at 59. 
26 Cf. Wesley Lowery & Kimberly Kindy, These Are the Racially Charged E-mails that Got 3 Ferguson 
Police and Court Officials Fired, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2015/04/03/these-are-the-racist-e-mails-that-got-3-ferguson-police-and-court-officials-fired/
[https://perma.cc/JUQ7-D32B] (discussing emails sent from Ferguson Police Department email addresses containing 
explicitly racist remarks); Pinto, supra note 23 (discussing police killings and impunity in Albuquerque and elsewhere). 
27 See, e.g., Lorie A. Fridell & Arnold Binder, Police Officer Decisionmaking in Potentially Violent 
Confrontations, 20 J. CRIM. JUST. 385, 397-98 (1992) (finding that scenarios in which officers shot community members, 
as compared to similar situations in which officers did not, more often involved “verbal interactions that make the subject 
angrier and result in noncompliance”); see also HANS TOCH, ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THROUGH INDIVIDUAL
EMPOWERMENT: APPLYING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN PRISONS AND POLICING 57, 60 (2014) (describing an Oakland Police 
Department peer review panel’s attribution of one officer’s tendency to “take immediate action (often physical in nature) 
when a subject would fail to comply immediately with his verbal directions” to the officer’s perception “that his authority . 
. . was being challenged by [such] citizens.”). 
28 See TOCH, supra note 27. 
29  John B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. 
Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 323 (2004) (citing CITY OF N.Y., COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE
ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCS. OF THE POLICE DEP’T, COMMISSION REPORT
(1994)).
30 See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., POLICE USE OF FORCE: RULES, REMEDIES,
AND REFORMS 3-8 (2015). 
31 See, e.g., Leah Libresco, Being Arrested Is Nearly Twice as Deadly for African-Americans as Whites,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, Jul. 23, 2015, http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/being-arrested-is-nearly-twice-as-deadly-for-african-
americans-as-whites/ [https://perma.cc/7CBB-B9K5] (showing that blacks are nearly twice as likely than whites to be 
killed by police during arrests or while in custody); Reuben Fischer-Baum & Carl Bialik, Blacks Are Killed by Police at a 
Higher Rate in South Carolina and the U.S., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, Apr. 8, 2015, http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/blacks-
are-killed-at-a-higher-rate-in-south-carolina-and-the-u-s/  [https://perma.cc/C9AA-YLUM] (finding that black citizens 
were overrepresented among unarmed civilians killed by police between March 2014 and March 2015); HOLMES &
SMITH, supra note 4, at vii, 5, 8-11 (stating that studies demonstrate a broad pattern of civil rights criminal complaints in 
large cities with relatively large racial/ethnic minority populations). 
32 See WALKER, supra note 2, at 71-73, 78 (stating that the lack of a culture of accountability results in a 
tendency to turn away citizens attempting to file complaints, fail to adequately investigate accusations of misconduct, and 
fail to punish officers who have committed misconduct); see also Pinto, supra note 23 (noting a dearth in Department of 
Justice investigations of police civil rights violations and a lack of reliable statistics on police killings); see also HOLMES
& SMITH, supra note 4, at viii (contending that such practices “are deeply embedded in the police subculture”). 
33 See HOLMES & SMITH, supra note 4, at 7; WALKER, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting Barbara Armacost, 
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 455) (arguing that the culture “facilitates and 
rewards [this] violent conduct”); MERRICK BOBB, L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 15TH SEMIANNUAL REPORT 10 (2002). 
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specific examples of this culture.34 Such a culture is clearly incompatible with the community-
oriented policing practice35 that many police reform efforts around the country have tried to 
implement over the years.36
B. Explanations
Studies attempting to isolate the causes of this behavior and culture tend to attribute it to 
several types of factors: (1) sociological or situational, (2) psychological or individual, and (3) 
organizational.37 The first emphasizes the situational dynamics perceived by the officer, such as 
the race, gender, and demeanor of the citizens; the second focuses on the characteristics of the 
officer, including race, personality, and bias; and the third suggests that police departments’ 
“organizational properties,” including subculture and administrative controls, shape officers’ 
behavior, including the likelihood that they will use excessive force.38 There is evidence that each 
factor plays a role.39 For instance, William A. Westley’s work shows that police behavior in the  
                                                                  
34 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department 139-
53 (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download [https://perma.cc/3UHR-QKM7]; U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice Civil Rights Div. & U.S. Attorney’s Office N. Dist. of Ill., Investigation of the Chicago Police Department 50-56 
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/XH2T-L59S]. 
35 See Anthony LaRose et al., Value Change Among Police Recruits in Mexico at a Time of Organizational 
Reform: A Follow-Up Study Using Rokeach Value Indicators, 34 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 53, 54 (2010) 
https://perma.cc/GX7N-26W7 (defining community policing as an effort “to reduce the social distance between the police 
and the policed as a means of empowering both, in an effort to address the root causes of physical and social disorder.”). 
36 See generally Wycoff & Skogan, supra note 14; G. Kelling & M. Moore, From Political Reform to 
Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 1 (J. Greene, J. & S. 
Mastrofski eds., 1988); see also Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 53 STAN. L. REV. 777, 
803 (2000) (arguing that both cultural norms and legal rules should be used to influence behavior). 
37  R.J. Friedrich, Police Use of Force: Individuals, Situations, and Organizations, 452 ANNALS OF THE 
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 84 (1980); R. E. Worden, The Causes of Police Brutality: 
Theory and Evidence on Police Use of Force, POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF 
FORCE 23-29 (A.W. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996); see also Joel H. Garner et al., Characteristics Associated with the 
Prevalence and Severity of Force Used by the Police, 19 JUST. Q. 705, 710 (2002); HOLMES & SMITH, supra note 4, at 
112-113 (diagramming the interplay of various factors in use of excessive force); DIAMOND & ALLCORN, supra note 13, at 
20 (summarizing, the “conceptual shift from individual to organizational psychology [that] takes place in the 
acknowledgement of patterned, repetitive, and collective actions that shape and characterize organizational culture”). 
38  HOLMES & SMITH, supra note 4, at 7-8. 
39 See, e.g., Brad W. Smith, Structural and Organizational Predictors of Homicide by Police, 27 POLICING
INT’L J. POLICE STRAT. & MGMT. 539, 550-53 (2004) (finding situational factors such as “racial threat”—proportion of 
African American residents in a city—and community violence—violent crime rate, and organizational factors such as 
number of hours of field training—to be positively correlated with police killings of civilians); William C. Bailey, Less-
Than-Lethal Weapons and Police-Citizen Killings in US Urban Areas, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 535, 547-550 (1996) 
(showing there is no evidence that less-than-lethal weapons help prevent police-citizen killings); Smith, supra, at 542-44 
(listing studies showing the predictiveness of situational factors in police brutality incidents); id. at 535-538 (listing studies 
showing the influence of organizational factors in such incidents); HOLMES & SMITH, supra note 4, at 7 (“The quasi-
military structure of policing, including the deployment of personal weapons arsenals and extensive training in the use of 
force, undoubtedly sets the stage for such transgressions”) (citing M. CHAMBLISS, POWER, POLITICS, AND CRIME (2001) 
and WESTLEY, supra note 23). 
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community “reflect[s] officers’ concerns, grounded in informal organizational norms 
[(organizational)], about the maintenance of authority and respect”: their belief that black people  
are prone to criminality and more threatening to police authority (individual) leads to their use of 
extra-legal force in situations involving black citizens perceived as disrespecting police 
(situational).40
Without taking one particular view of what explains the culture and corresponding 
behavior, this article contends that organizational change efforts that incorporate all three 
factors—one that facilitates individuals’ examination of their own responses to situational stimuli, 
allowing them to shift their perspective—can be particularly impactful. Moreover, it argues that 
organizational change efforts will continue to fall short if they fail to shift policing culture, not 
just its design, practices, or the bad apples within it. That is consistent with findings from social 
psychology research indicating a strong relationship between employee values, organizational 
culture, and the success or failure of organizational change efforts.41
It is worth noting that the disparate treatment of people of color is not unique to police,42
leading some to conclude that without broader societal change, changing the culture of policing 
may be impossible.43 While it may be true that complete transformation is not a feasible short-
term goal, this article assumes that some change is possible, and it is worth exploring how that 
change can be achieved. 
                                                                  
40  HOLMES & SMITH, supra note 4, at 8 (citing W. A. Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 AM. J. OF SOC.
34 (1953) and WESTLEY, supra note 23). 
41 See, e.g., Leanne Fiftal Alarid, Law Enforcement Departments as Learning Organizations: Argyris’ 
Theory as a Framework for Implementing Community-Oriented Policing, 2 POLICE Q., 321, 333 (2000) (arguing that 
successful organizational changes requires individuals within an organization to change their old ways of thinking); John 
Amis et al., Values and Organizational Change. 38 J. OF APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 436 (2002) (showing that when proposed 
organizational changes do not align with existing organizational culture, employees resist the change); M. Rokeach & S. 
Ball-Rokeach, Stability and Change in American Value Priorities: 1968-1981, 44 AM. PSYCHOL., 777 (1989) (showing 
values in America remained constant over a thirteen year period); B. K. Spiker & E. Lesser, We Have Met the Enemy, 16 
J. BUS. STRAT. 17 (1995); D. Waddell & A. S. Sohal, Resistance: A Constructive Tool for Change Management, 36 
MGMT. DECISION 543 (1998). 
42  A witness to the President’s Task Force testified, “Bias is not limited to so-called ‘bad people.’ And it 
certainly is not limited to police officers. The problem is a widespread one that arises from history, from culture, and from 
racial inequalities that still pervade our society and are especially salient in the context of criminal justice.” TASK FORCE,
supra note 16, at 10 (citing Oral Testimony for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) (testimony of 
Jennifer Eberhardt), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/submissions/Eberhardt_Testimony_Submitted.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/277Y-XUE6]).
43 See, e.g., HOLMES & SMITH, supra note 4, at 140-41 (voicing skepticism about the potential of “popular 
proposals” for organizational reform “because of the intractable qualities of the intergroup dynamics involved,” and 
suggesting that breaking down barriers that separate racial/ethnic and social class groupings may be “avenues for 
meaningful change”). 
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C. Resistance to Change
When it comes to the policing organization, which is particularly resistant to change,44
cultural change is particularly important. Yet attention to police culture has too often been 
missing from the organizational change equation, which explains, at least in part, why so many 
police reform efforts have failed.45 For instance, as part of its settlement agreement ending a civil 
rights suit, the Philadelphia Police Department in 1996 instituted a use-of-force reporting system, 
but the department’s established habits were a major obstacle to successful implementation.46
Several years after the system’s launch, an independent audit found “a deeply ingrained resistance 
to implementing the system[,]” including some commanders viewing controls over the use of 
force “with resentment, cynicism and suspicion” and others viewing the process as a “waste of 
time.”47 Consequently, the disciplinary process “has remained fundamentally the same for 
decades.”48
In Washington, D.C., almost two years after signing a settlement agreement with the 
Department of Justice agreeing to develop a use-of-force reporting system in 2001,49 the 
Metropolitan Police Department’s rate of completion of required incident reports varied month to 
month from 25% to 86% due to “confusion” about the requirements and lack of a “culture of 
accountability.”50 The court-appointed monitor of the Oakland Police Department following the 
settlement of a police misconduct case, Delphine Allen, et al., v. City of Oakland, et al.,51 made 
similar findings in its Second Semi-Annual Report.52 The report found that the department was 
only in full compliance in four out of fifty tasks required by the agreement.53 For example, the 
                                                                  
44 See Zhao, supra note 14, at 155-56 (citing Herman Goldstein, Toward Community-Oriented Policing: 
Potential, Basic Requirements and Threshold Questions, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 6 (1987), ROBERT TROJANOWICZ &
BONNIE BUCQUEROUX, COMMUNITY POLICING: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1990), Robert Wasserman & Mark 
Moore, Values in Policing, 8 Perspectives on Policing (1988), Dennis Nowicki, Mixed Messages, in COMMUNITY
POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 265 (G. Alpert & A. Piquero, eds., 1998), Jihong Zhao & Quint Thurman, 
Community Policing: Where Are We Now?, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 345 (1997) (finding that after over ten years of changes 
toward community-oriented policing, the mean ratings of departmental functions—crime control, order maintenance, and 
provision of services—among 281 police agencies surveyed across the country were virtually identical to what they were a 
decade ago; they continue to reflect traditional law enforcement and crime fighting), Susan Sadd & Randolph Grinc, 
Innovative Neighborhood Oriented Policing: An Evaluation of Community Policing Programs in Eight Cities, in THE
CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING: TESTING THE PROMISES, supra note 14, at 35 (“[P]atrol officers are particularly 
resistant to the transition to community policing because community policing seeks to redefine their role and the way they 
perform their duties”)). 
45 Cf., Zhao et al., supra note 8, at 32 (finding that police values orientation remained nearly constant 
during the thirty years preceding the study). 
46  WALKER, supra note 2, at 69-70 (citing Philadelphia, Integrity & Accountability Off., Discipline System
(1999), at 6, 52). 
47 Id. at 69 (citing Philadelphia, Integrity & Accountability Off., Use of Force, at 12). 
48 Id. at 69-70 (citing Philadelphia, Integrity & Accountability Off., Discipline System (1999), at 6).
49 See Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Case Profile: DOJ Investigation of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan 
Police Department, Civil Rights Investigation Clearinghouse, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=1026 [https:// 
perma.cc/5VR9-ELQJ].
50 WALKER, supra note 2, at 184-85. 
51 For full records of the follow-up reports, see City of Oakland, NSA Archives, 
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/government/o/OPD/OAK059862 [https://perma.cc/A9AD-KKBA]. 
52  Oakland Police Dept., Negotiated Settlement Agreement: Second Semi-Annual Report (Feb. 18, 2004), 
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/police/documents/report/dowd006403.pdf [https://perma.cc/S26X-XV88]. 
53 Id. at 4. 
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decree required the police to complete a report about every stop, investigation, and detention.54
The monitor found a compliance rate of only 26%, which officers attributed to insufficient 
training and the time-consuming nature of the forms.55 These are but a few examples of numerous 
change efforts nationwide that have been met with resistance.56
D. The Force of Tomorrow
Recognizing the cultural shift required to enable lasting change in policing, a task force 
convened by President Obama to study the problem of policing57 listed, as its first 
recommendation: “Law enforcement culture should embrace a guardian—rather than a warrior—
mindset.”58 According to the Task Force’s vision, that means “adopt[ing] procedural justice as the 
guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices,”59 “establish[ing] a culture of 
transparency and accountability to build public trust and legitimacy,”60 “promot[ing] public trust 
by initiating positive non-enforcement activities to engage communities that typically have high 
rates of investigative and enforcement involvement with government agencies,”61 and espousing 
“a culture and practice . . . that reflects the values of protection and promotion of the dignity of 
all.”62 This is precisely the type of culture that would provide fertile ground for other police 
reform efforts—such as a shift to community-oriented policing63—including the other changes 
proposed by the Task Force.64 While a number of police chiefs have already declared their 
intention to make such a cultural change,65 in general, that prescription looks very different from 
                                                                  
54 Id. at 81. 
55 Id. at 82; WALKER, supra note 2, at 186 (concluding, “[t]he officers’ comments . . . reflect the traditional 
police organizational culture that is disinterested in accountability. . . . These are the nitty-gritty aspects of organizational
culture that need to change to achieve meaningful accountability.”). 
56 See, e.g., id. at 179 (listing failed organizational change efforts). 
57  The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Dec. 
18, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/fact-sheet-task-force-21st-century-policing
[https://perma.cc/A39W-555Q].
58  TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 1. 
59 Id. The Task Force later defines procedurally just behavior as involving the following four principles: 
“treating people with dignity and respect . . . giving individuals ‘voice’ during encounters . . . being neutral and transparent
in decision making . . . conveying trustworthy motives[.]” Id. at 10. 
60 Id. at 1. 
61 Id. at 2. 
62 Id. at 3. 
63 See Zhao, supra note 14, at 153-54, 165 (citing John E. Eck & Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The New Police 
Order: Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency in Community Policing, in THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING:
TESTING THE PROMISES, supra note 14, at 3 (finding that community-oriented policing requires values of social equity and 
fairness), HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY (1977), and TROJANOWICZ & BUCQUEROUX, supra note 44).
64  Besides community policing, the Task Force’s other recommended changes include, for example, the 
implementation of policies aligned with community values (e.g. around use of force), and use of technology and social 
media in accordance with defined purposes. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 2. 
65 See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING: ONE YEAR PROGRESS REPORT 6-7 (2016), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/ 
TaskForce_Annual_Report.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Just. Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., Success Story Map, 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2827; see also, e.g., Amy McConnell Schaarsmith, Incoming City Police Chief 
Says He Wants to Change the Bureau’s Culture, MCCLATCHY - TRIBUNE BUSINESS NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014) (Pittsbugh), 
https://perma.cc/HR8F-PMCD; Mike Blasky, Oakland Police Becoming Example for Departments Seeking to Reform,
SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (May 9, 2015), http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/general-news/20150509/oakland-police-
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the predominant culture today.66 Using the warrior-to-guardian proposal as a proxy for the type of 
cultural change a department might pursue as a requisite foundation for other policy and practice 
changes, the following section will explore the process that change management theory would 
recommend to facilitate such a shift. 
II. A NEW WAY FORWARD: CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
A. Why Change Is Hard
Culture change is difficult not only in police departments, but in all organizations.67
Social psychologists explain that resistance to change within an organization is a product 
of the trauma experienced by employees and the organization itself when there is an unexplained 
change in policy, procedure, or practice.68 According to change management experts, when 
managers pursue change “under existing norms,” the effort produces “a conflict in the norms 
themselves.”69 Thus, changing policing is not as simple as changing a policy, practice, or 
structure: it requires that officers “be resocialized into understanding their purpose.”70 It is this 
very quandary—how to “chang[e] a complex bureaucracy to achieve worthy goals”71—that 
organizational change research addresses.
B. What Does It Take to Make a Switch
“For individuals’ behavior to change, you’ve got to influence not only their environment 
but their hearts and minds.”72 That is the mantra that change management gurus Chip and Dan 
Heath expound in their bestselling book, Switch: How to Change Things When Change Is Hard,73
which research has confirmed to be true in the case of policing.74 The challenge that the Heath 
brothers reference is often overlooked in organizational change efforts,75 but is central to effective 
                                                                  
becoming-example-for-departments-seeking-to-reform [https://perma.cc/CTB3-SHWL] (“[Chief] Whent, at the helm for 
about two years, has been quietly chipping away at the agency’s cowboy culture reputation.”). 
66 See supra pp. 5-8. 
67 See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 2, at 70 (discussing how police forces and other large organizations are 
often resistant to change). 
68 See, e.g., LLOYD C. WILLIAMS, ORGANIZATIONAL VIOLENCE: CREATING A PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE
5-6 (1994) (explaining how sudden changes in policy cause trauma for employees and the surrounding organization).  
69 See KEGAN & LAHEY, supra note 10, at 26, n. 7 (quoting CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD A. SCHÖN,
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: A THEORY OF ACTION PERSPECTIVE 21 (1978)). To indicate the trauma-inducing nature of 
this type of organizational change process devoid of collaboration and inclusiveness, some call it “organizational 
violence.” See WILLIAMS, supra note 61, at 6. 
70  WALKER, supra note 2, at 184. 
71 Id. (citing MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE (1998)). 
72  CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, SWITCH: HOW TO CHANGE THINGS WHEN CHANGE IS HARD 5 (2010). 
73 See generally id. The idea of the dueling systems is based on “conventional wisdom in psychology” and 
behavioral economics, which calls the two systems “the Planner and the Doer.” See id. at 6-7. 
74  Sadd & Grinc, supra note 44, at 35 (finding that organizational change toward COP entails a fight for the 
“hearts and minds” of patrol officers, and that officers are “particularly resistant” to that transition because “community 
policing seeks to redefine their role and the way they perform their duties.”).
75 See DIAMOND & ALLCORN, supra note 13, at 189 (claiming, “[p]sychological structure matters and is 
often overlooked in organizational change.”). 
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change management: how to develop the capacity and motivation of individuals within a group, 
and the group as a whole, to enable change.76
Borrowing an analogy from psychologist Jonathan Haidt, the Heath brothers attribute the 
challenge with change to the inherent tension between humans’ emotional side, an Elephant, and 
rational side, its Rider.77 Each can sabotage change efforts—the Rider by spinning her wheels and 
overanalyzing and the Elephant by refusing to move.78 While the Rider tries to control the 
Elephant, when the two disagree, the Rider, the rational, long-term thinking function, will lose. 
Successful efforts to stimulate behavior change, and organizational change, thus must appeal to 
both by “direct[ing] the Rider, motivat[ing] the Elephant, and shap[ing] the Path.”79
Behavioral science research has demonstrated the effectiveness of this model in changing 
behavior at both the individual and organizational levels. For instance, research shows that 
techniques such as encouraging people to make a detailed plan about how they will vote, invoking 
their self-identification as a “voter,” and telling them that turnout will be high can significantly 
increase their likelihood of voting.80 In other words, identifying a clear goal and concrete steps to 
get there (directing the rider), cultivating identification as the type of person who would undertake 
the desired behavior (motivating the elephant), and tapping into peer pressure to spread a good 
habit (shaping the path) “nudge” people to do something they otherwise would not have done.81
The Elephant and Rider analogy provides a useful, if simplistic, frame with which to 
explore how future efforts to improve policing could more effectively shift its organizational 
culture to make change more permanent. The following sections will engage that framework, as 
well as others from social and organizational psychology, to examine existing efforts and make 
recommendations for future ones. 
1. Direct the Rider
According to the Heath Brothers, to convince the rational side of the brain to accept 
change one must “follow the bright spots[,]” “script the critical moves[,]” and “point to the 
destination.”82 In the policing context, this means articulating a clear vision of the end goal of the 
department’s change process, replicating the work of other departments operating in similar 
contexts—or teams within the department—that have affected the desired change, and articulating 
the path to getting there. 
                                                                  
76 See KEGAN & LAHEY, supra note 10, at 26. 
77  HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 7 (citing JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING
MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT WISDOM (2006)).
78 Id. at 7-8. 
79 Id. at 19. 
80 See generally David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Do You Have a Voting Plan? Implementation 
Intentions, Voter Turnout, and Organic Plan Making, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 194 (2010) (detailed plan); C. Bryan et al., 
Motivating Voter Turnout by Invoking the Self, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 12653 (2011), 
https://perma.cc/6S7S-PXMB (self-identification); A.S. Gerber & Todd Rogers, Descriptive Social Norms and Motivation 
to Vote: Everyone’s Voting and so Should You, 71 J. POL. 178 (2009), available at https://scholar.harvard.edu/todd_rogers/ 
publications/descriptive-social-norms-and-motivation-vote-everybodys-voting-and-so
[https://perma.cc/5NAU-65K6] (high turnout). 
81 See generally, RICHARD R. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009). 
82  HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 259. 
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Replicating the bright spots means focusing on what is working, understanding why, and 
cloning it.83 There are several examples of police departments or teams that have made a change 
work. Whether or not they focused on the precise change explored in this article—moving from a 
warrior to a guardian culture—the process of examining them models the process that this article 
recommends a department that is attempting to shift its culture should undertake. 
For example, it appears that something is working in Richmond, California. Historically 
one of the most violent cities in the Bay Area, Richmond, a city of 106,000, had less than one 
officer-involved shooting per year between 2008 and 2013—four total during that period—with 
no one killed by an officer since 2007.84 During the same period, Oakland, a city of 400,000, had 
33 officer-involved shootings, 20 of them fatal.85 Less populous jurisdictions than Richmond, 
such as San Pablo, Antioch, Concord, and the area patrolled by Contra Costa Sheriff’s Office, 
have had between two (San Pablo and Concord) and nine (Contra Costa) fatal officer-involved 
shootings.86 Clearly, Richmond is worth a closer look.87
According to Lieutenant Louie Tirona, Richmond’s head firearms and tactics instructor, 
the Richmond Police Department is distinct from its neighbors in its training rigor, its emphasis 
on communication with armed suspects, and its philosophy—and aligned policies88—that officers 
may use force only as a last resort.89 It also differs in the frequency with which its officers receive 
firearm training and participate in role-playing scenarios for disarming suspects.90 Since 2008, 
when officer-involved shootings dropped in the jurisdiction, the department has upped its 
trainings from yearly to monthly and moved from an “impact team” policing model to a 
“community policing” model focused on relationship building.91 For comparison, Concord 
officers participate in use of force training semi-annually.92 Richmond officers also “use a case  
                                                                  
83 Id. at 40-48. 
84  Robert Rogers & David DeBolt, Use of Deadly Force by Police Disappears on Richmond Streets, EAST




87  Violent crime was falling during this period in Richmond as well. See Steve Rubenstein, Richmond
Police Chief Chris Magnus to Head Tuscon Department, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 16, 2015, 7:35 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Richmond-Police-Chief-Chris-Magnus-headed-to-6636933.php [https://perma.cc/ 
G5X7-2SJZ] (noting that homicides fell from 62 in 1991, to 47 in 2007 and 2009, to just 11 in 2015). Regardless, the fact 
that officer-involved shootings were so low in comparison to Richmond’s population, and officer-involved shootings 
neighboring cities, suggests that it warrants exploration and study. Moreover, while no causal claims are being made here, 
it is possible that the tactics associated with less killings by police officers could be contributing to the reduced violent 
crime rates as well. 
88  For instance, Richmond reviews all incidents in which force is used. See id.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91  Richmond Police Lieutenant Shawn Pickett describes “impact policing” as a model in which officers 
“roam” through crime-ridden neighborhoods seeking to make arrests. Id. Also note, the training tactics are similar to those 
Toch identifies as effective in the Oakland Police Department in the 1970’s: the department tripled training time spent on 
“community-police relations,” including de-escalation tactics, to 157 instructional hours, and employed role-playing 
throughout training, including videotape replay that allowed officers to review and critique their performances. See TOCH,
supra note 27, at 57 (quoting Oakland Police Dep’t, Recruit Training Program: Progress Report (n.d), at 13). 
92 See Rogers & DeBolt, supra note 84. 
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study approach,” studying and questioning use-of-force incidents that occurred in other 
jurisdictions.93
Another example of a bright spot involves a particularly effective use of a police 
accountability tool called an Early Intervention (EI) System.94 In a large, unidentified police 
department, an EI system flagged an officer’s frequent use of excessive force.95 During the 
resulting counseling session, the officer described her fear of being hit in the face, which appeared 
to be causing her to lose control of encounters with citizens and then trigger her use of force to 
reassert control.96 The EI panel sent her to training, where she was instructed in tactics that would 
allow her to maintain control while also protecting herself. 97 In another jurisdiction, an EI 
counseling session revealed that an officer was struggling financially.98 The EI recommended that 
the officer seek professional financial consulting, which he did.99 In both cases, the officers’ 
performance improved considerably.100 While police departments have historically been 
“punishment-oriented,”101 in these instances, early identification, open conversation, and outside-
the-box solutions appear to have been effective in instilling a desired change. Proponents suggest 
that the individual changes effected by these EI systems could have an even broader impact in 
shifting the role of sergeants towards one of guidance and support,102 changing the organization’s 
“formal and informal norms[,]” and moving the department culture towards enhanced 
accountability.103 Despite recent criticism of EI systems in general,104 the preceding inquiry into 
how such an intervention was effectively implemented in this department is precisely the type of 
examination the Heath brothers would recommend: neighboring police departments can learn 
from such “bright spots” operating in similar contexts, gain hope that change is possible, and 
borrow liberally.105
                                                                  
93 See id.
94 See WALKER, supra note 2, at 102. EI systems are “data-based management tools . . . used to identify 
officers who exhibit potentially problematic behavior.” They centralize and track data about citizens and departmental 
complaints, accidents, and use-of-force. See, e.g., HOLMES & SMITH, supra note 4, at 132. For more on EI systems see
WALKER, supra note 2, at 100-34. 
95  WALKER, supra note 2, at 102 (citing Commander responsible for EI system in an unidentified police 






101 Id. at 104 (citing HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICE CORRUPTION (1975)). 
102 See id. at 133. 
103 Id. at 120. For further reading about Chicago’s work to develop an EI system, see Ted Gregory, U. of C. 
Researchers Use Data to Predict Police Misconduct, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-
big-data-police-misconduct-met-20160816-story.html.
104 See, e.g., Kimbriell Kelly, Can Big Data Stop Bad Cops? (Aug. 21, 2016), WASH. POST
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/can-big-data-stop-bad-cops/2016/08/21/12db0728-3fb6-11e6-a66f-
aa6c1883b6b1_story.html?utm_term=.9a844e8ec6b7 [https://perma.cc/AVC3-FNCG]. 
105   HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 48 (“These flashes of success—these bright spots—can illuminate 
the road map for action and spark the hope that change is possible.”). 
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Beyond identifying and cloning successes, leaders of effective change management 
efforts should “point to the destination” and “script the critical moves.”106 An anecdote from the 
Fresno Police Department illustrates what that means, and what impact it can have. The 
department convened a subcommittee on use of force in 2001.107 In its final report, the 
subcommittee declared that, although “many other departments did not track this [use-of-force] 
data for fear of providing plaintiff’s [sic] attorneys with information that would assist them in 
suing the departments, . . .  the ability to know what is going on outweighs the disadvantages of 
giving any information to plaintiff’s [sic] attorneys.”108 In this report, the subcommittee is 
“sell[ing] the vision” of becoming a better department that is more accountable to the community, 
and targeting “a specific behavior that’s within the control of the [department]”109: data collection 
and analysis. Accordingly, in 2003, the department issued and fully disclosed on its website a 
report on its use-of-force data correlated with a number of variables including race of suspect, 
type of force used, type of incident, day of the week, and suspect actions.110 By “marry[ing] [its] 
long-term goal with short-term critical moves,”111 the department convinced its officers that the 
change was feasible and worthwhile, anticipating their hesitations and opening a ramp to get them 
on board.112
2. Motivate the Elephant
Beyond understanding the vision and next steps for change, individuals in a changing 
organization also need to believe that they can change, and that who they are is aligned with that 
change. The Heath brothers call this part of the process “find[ing] the feeling[,]” explaining that 
positive emotions such as interest and pride make individuals more open to accepting new ideas 
and taking on new types of tasks.113 Organizational change experts Robert Kegan and Lisa 
Laskow Lahey discuss this emotional side of the change process in their seminal book, Immunity 
to Change.114 As they explain elsewhere, overcoming immunity to change “asks people to call 
into question beliefs they’ve long held close . . . [and] to admit to painful, even embarrassing, 
feelings[.]”115 This step is likely to be particularly challenging within a culture of masculinity, as 
in the police force,116 but it is crucial to a successful change process.117
                                                                  
106 See HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 259; see also DIAMOND & ALLCORN, supra note 13, at 186 
(noting that “[c]larifying the intervention process and method at the outset” enhances employees’ “interpersonal security 
and safety”). 
107 See WALKER, supra note 2, at 188. 
108 Id.
109 See HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 84. 
110  WALKER, supra note 2, at 189. 
111  HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 93. 
112  The White House Police Data Initiative has encouraged agencies to release their data. Press Release, 
The White House, FACT SHEET: White House Police Data Initiative Highlights New Commitments (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/22/fact-sheet-white-house-police-data-initiative-highlights-new-
commitments [https://perma.cc/U6PC-V8UQ]. At the time of this writing, 129 agencies had agreed to do so. Police 
Found., Public Safety Portal, https://publicsafetydataportal.org/ [https://perma.cc/JC7J-8NE4]. 
113 Id. at 123. 
114  KEGAN & LAHEY, supra note 10. 
115  Robert Kegan & Lisa Laskow Lahey, The Real Reason People Won’t Change, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.
2001, at 86.
116 See, e.g., Nigel Fielding, Cop Canteen Culture, in JUST BOYS DOING BUSINESS? MEN, MASCULINITIES
AND CRIME (Tim Newburn & Elizabeth Stanko eds.) (1994); Vanessa Garcia, Constructing the ‘Other’ within Police 
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Some social psychologists suggest that this step must begin with “an organizational 
diagnosis confirmed by [participants],”118 in other words, an opportunity to reflect on the state of 
the organization. Indeed, this is the first step that Bill Bratton undertook when he became chief of 
the New York Police Department:119 he administered a survey about the cultural values and 
priorities of the organization, and discovered that the field officers shared his priorities.120 To 
Bratton, this indicated an obvious opportunity for an alliance in the change-making process.121
Bratton’s process was more top-down than that advocated by social psychologists Michael 
Diamond and Seth Allcorn,122 and the end goal was different from that proposed here.123
However, Bratton’s effective shift of the department’s priorities124 presents a valuable lesson in 
change management in police departments: people’s values and priorities matter.125
Kegan and Lahey advocate a more holistic, individualized process, in which leaders 
facilitate employees’ “honest introspection and candid disclosure” of their “competing 
commitments.”126 Competing commitments, as Kegan and Lahey define them, arise from the “big 
assumptions—deeply rooted beliefs about themselves and the world around them”127 that hold 
people back from adapting and growing.128 They argue that leaders cannot change organizations 
without “guiding [employees] through a productive process to bring their competing 
commitments to the surface, and helping them cope with the inner conflict that is preventing them 
from achieving their goals.”129
                                                                  
Culture: An Analysis of a Deviant Unit within the Police Organization, 6 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 65, 69 (2005) (“[T]the 
multiplicity of police cultures identified in the [police] research are all rooted in masculinity.”) (citation omitted); Herbert,
supra note 18, at 343; cf. Garcia, supra, at 66 (“[P]olice tend to value the crime-fighting function, which is associated with 
masculinity, the most and the social service function, which is associated with femininity, the least.”) (citations omitted). 
117 See DIAMOND & ALLCORN, supra note 13, at 190. 
118 Id. at 175. Cf. WALKER, supra note 2, at 187 (noting that effective accountability efforts require that a 
department first “undertake a rigorous and proactive self-assessment of its own accountability policies,” and, second, 
“engage community representatives in that process and fully and publicly disclose what it is doing”); TOCH, supra note 27, 
at 94 (explaining that an intervention to change the parental nature of staff-inmate interactions at Penninghame Prison was 
aided by examining participants’ relevant feelings and attitudes). 
119 See Yuksel, supra note 16, at 432 (citing WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: HOW
AMERICA’S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998); JOHN BUNTIN, ASSERTIVE POLICING, PLUMMETING CRIME:
THE NYPD TAKES ON CRIME IN NEW YORK CITY (1999)). 
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See generally DIAMOND & ALLCORN, supra note 13. 
123 See supra pp. 11-12 (discussing the change from a warrior mindset to a guardian mindset). 
124 See, e.g., Yuksel, supra note 16. 
125 See Zhao et al., Value Change, supra note 14, at 153 (citing MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (1980) (individual values strongly influence behavior 
in a police organization); WILLIAM MUIR, POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS (1977) (individuals bring their values and 
beliefs to a police department)). 
126  Kegan & Lahey, supra note 104, at 86. 
127 Id. at 88. 
128 Id. at 90 (“Because big assumptions are held as fact, they actually inform what people see, leading them 
to systematically (but unconsciously) attend to certain data and avoid or ignore other data.”). 
129 Id. at 92. See also DIAMOND & ALLCORN, supra note 13, at 9 (“[T]he human process of change in 
organizations frequently means that participants overcome their typical resistances to change by opening themselves up 
emotionally to their anxieties about separation and loss.”). 
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The Oakland Police Department’s Peer Review Panel, born in the 1970s, exemplifies the 
power of this process.130 The brainchild of an officer previously identified as prone to excessive 
use of force, the program was modeled after a substance-abuse treatment program run by former 
addicts that took a “therapeutic approach designed to break down obdurate defenses.” 131 The 
panel consisted of seven officers—all identified as “problem officers”—reviewing the behavioral 
patterns of other officers.132 Panelists encouraged the participating officer to read his own arrest 
reports and engage in self-reflection.133 As the officer who created the program explained, “You 
know, after he reads [some of his own arrest reports] somebody asks the questions. . . . And [he] 
would have to stop and think, ‘Do I do that very often?’”134 The department later institutionalized 
this program as the Conflict Management Section, which ran studies, action reviews, and other 
interventions to reduce conflict in police-citizen interactions.135
These programs mirror the process proposed by Kegan and Lahey in the way that they 
involve fellow members of the force communicating helpful intentions and facilitating the 
subject’s own thinking and honest disclosure.136 As Kegan and Lahey would predict, the programs 
were highly effective. During the years the program was in place, the department met its goals 
regarding the review subjects’ performance and reduced its overall number of police-citizen 
confrontations.137 The program’s effectiveness lay in its ability to prove to both the subjects and 
participants on the panel that they were important change agents, a demonstration that 
“enhance[d] their self-esteem and commitment to the project.”138
In other words, by focusing on the participation of those who will be affected by the 
change, these interventions cultivated a sense of identity and a “growth mindset”139 that prepared 
participants to not only accept the change, but to orchestrate it.140 This element of change 
                                                                  
130  TOCH, supra note 27, at 72. Note: The program was also called the “Action Review Panel.” 
131 Id. at 51-55. 
132  The subject officers had volunteered or been nominated by supervisors. Id. at 58-61. 
133 Id. at 58-59. 
134 Id. at 58-59 (citing HANS TOCH & J.D. GRANT, POLICE AS PROBLEM SOLVERS: HOW FRONTLINE
WORKERS CAN PROMOTE ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMMUNITY CHANGE 170 (2005)). 
135 Id. at 71. 
136 See id. at 61-62. 
137 Id. at 62. Later, another police chief discarded the reforms in an effort to economize, Oakland went into 
receivership, and now, following a Department of Justice consent decree, is resisting change. Id. at 62 (quoting Norimitsu 
Onishi, Overrun by Crime, Oakland Looks to Make Allies in Community, N.Y. TIMES, at 11 (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/us/to-cut-crime-oakland-to-reduce-size-of-police-districts.html  [https://perma.cc/ 
BWC7-594B]).
138 Id. at 65. Toch describes his intervention technique as follows:
(a) it involves the maladaptive person as participant rather than as client; (b) it does not require a categorization of the 
person’s problem (such as substance abuse, mental illness, or learning disability) to define the service he or she receives; 
(c) it provides for gradations of environment in which to test developing competence; (d) it mobilizes teams of staff 
members, including staff primarily concerned with behavioral and mental health problems; (e) it relies on group process 
and group thinking to buttress staff influence; and (f) it accommodates tailor-made interventions to address individual 
patterns of maladaptation. 
Id. at 161 (quoting HANS TOCH & KENNETH ADAMS, ACTING OUT: MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR IN CONFINEMENT 422 
(2002)).
139 See HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 164. 
140 Cf. TOCH, supra note 27, at 168 (quoting G.W. ALLPORT, PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL ENCOUNTER:
SELECTED ESSAYS 197 (1960)) (“[I]n focusing upon participation social psychology will also be advancing democracy, for 
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management is particularly important in the policing context, where those subject to the proposed 
change are often aware of a negative public image of themselves, which can “deflate [their] pride 
and self-esteem.”141 A recent study about the so-called “Ferguson effect,” or reduced police 
motivation caused by negative publicity, confirms the impact of self-esteem on willingness to 
change in the context of policing.142 The study shows that while the Ferguson effect is associated 
with a decreased willingness to adopt a community partnership ethic, the effect disappears when 
organizational justice and self-legitimacy are taken into account.143 In other words, “officers who 
have confidence in their authority or perceive their agency as fair are more willing to partner with 
the community to solve problems, regardless of the effects of negative publicity.”144
Even prior to this research, the Seattle Police Department implemented a program that 
can serve as a model for how to incorporate this insight into change management efforts. In 2004, 
the department’s Office of Professional Accountability (OPA) launched an “unprecedented” 
internal outreach program, which involved OPA personally presenting the department’s policies 
around investigations of citizen complaints to over 400 officers.145 The presentations allowed 
officers to ask questions and raise concerns with OPA, which made them feel more involved in 
the department’s accountability effort. While quantitative evaluations of this program are 
unavailable,146 the results of the “Ferguson effect” study suggest that programs like Seattle’s 
would increase officers’ willingness to collaborate with the community, taking them one step 
away from the warrior mentality and one step towards that of a guardian. 
As social psychologist Hans Toch explained, citing founder of social psychology Kurt 
Lewin and echoing Kegan and Lahey’s findings, “The way to change people is to work through  
their resistances. It is here that participation becomes important, because participation is a way of 
making people face their hang-ups, so that they can give them up after they have worked them 
through.”147 In sum, “when people work hard on something, they get a stake in it.”148
3. Shape the Path
The final element of the Heath brothers’ model is “shaping the path,” or creating the 
conditions for success.149 Effectively, this is the follow-through—it involves creating the 
conditions such that, once an individual has worked through their competing commitments, 
                                                                  
. . . the task of obtaining from the common man participation in matters affecting his own destiny is the central problem of 
democracy.”).
141 See id. at 163 (quoting HANS TOCH & J.D. GRANT, REFORMING HUMAN SERVICES: CHANGE THROUGH
PARTICIPATION 223 (1982)) (reciting from a participating correction officer’s proposal for a model of prison reform 
similar to that proposed here for policing).
142 See generally Scott Wolfe & Justin Nix, The Alleged “Ferguson Effect” and Police Willingness to 
Engage in Community Partnership, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2015), http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/lhb/40/1/1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/
Q66D-JEAA].
143 See id. at 7. 
144 See id. at 1. 
145  WALKER, supra note 2, at 190. 
146  The report is available on the Seattle Police Department website. Id. at 191. 
147  TOCH, supra note 27, at 68. 
148 Id. at 69. 
149  HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 259. 
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change is the path of least resistance. Social psychology literature also reflects the importance of 
this element in change management, explaining that the process requires “‘unfreez[ing]’ old 
habits and ‘freez[ing]’ new ones.”150 Toch suggests practical tactics such as encouraging 
individuals to commit to tasks, orchestrating reward and “prod[ding]” by peers, and providing 
tools to launch the change.151 The Heath brothers advocate tweaking the environment, building 
habits, and helping behavior spread through peer pressure.152
This element in particular is very context-specific, and will not be explored at length 
here. However, to briefly demonstrate the concept, it is worth revisiting several of the examples 
discussed in previous sections. For instance, Oakland’s peer review panels were effective because 
they were able to harness the power of peer influence, emphasize behavior change, and reinforce 
attitudes consistent with the desired culture.153 “Behavior is contagious,”154 and those 
participating in the panel, formerly those whose behavior was most inconsistent with the culture  
that the force wanted to move towards, were both practicing the desirable behavior themselves 
and modeling it for others. Moreover, by investing time and effort into the concept, the panel 
members and, perhaps to a lesser extent, their subjects, were “get[ting] a stake in it.”155
Similarly, Richmond’s drop in police shootings and killings corresponded with the new 
chief’s decision to switch from “impact teams” roving high-crime neighborhoods in search of 
arrests to a community-oriented model focused on relationship building.156 Fresno began its 
reform effort by disbanding its most militaristic unit.157 Each change tweaked the officers’ 
environment and habits: instead of entering communities in an offensive stance, Richmond police 
presumably became accustomed to engaging with the community in positive ways. 
On the contrary, the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department’s failure to 
complete required incident reports can be attributed in part to the department’s failure to 
“chang[e] the routine habits of officers.”158 Had the department, for example, incorporated the 
incident reports into the officers’ routine to the point that it became automatic, or began the 
change process by requiring only a short incident report and moved to a more in-depth one after 
officers were already in the habit of completing them, change might have been more feasible. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Changing behavior is neither easy nor impossible. Police departments, like any other 
organization, are “artifacts of human nature.”159 To change them requires changing the hearts and 
minds within them. As history has shown, without a concerted effort to motivate, grow, and guide 
officers toward their new guardian roles, organizational policy and practice changes designed to 
reduce the use of unnecessary force and make policing more responsive to community needs will 
be evanescent. This article advocates for employing a change management approach to shift 
                                                                  
150  TOCH, supra note 27, at 69. 
151 Id.
152  HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 259. 
153 See TOCH, supra note 27, at 72 (quoting DARREL W. STEPHENS, POLICE DISCIPLINE: A CASE FOR 
CHANGE 17 (2011)). 
154  HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 259. 
155  TOCH, supra note 27, at 69. 
156  Rogers & DeBolt, supra note 84. 
157  WALKER, supra note 2, at 187. 
158 Id. at 185. 
159  DIAMOND & ALLCORN, supra note 13, at ix. 
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policing culture to one more fertile for such policy and practice changes. This approach requires 
“providing clear direction, ample motivation, and a supportive environment” for the change.160 In 
short, officers’ Riders, Elephants, and Paths must all be “aligned in support of the switch.”161
Even with such a process, change will be difficult and costly.162 Working through resistance 
always is. But the alternative is more costly still.163
                                                                  
160  HEATH & HEATH, supra note 72, at 255. 
161 Id.
162  DIAMOND & ALLCORN, supra note 13, at 175. 
163 See, e.g., CHIKE CROSLIN ET AL., HARVARD BLACK LAW STUDENTS ASSOCIATION, INDEPENDENT
LENS: TOWARD TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICE TACTICS (Apr. 2015), at 9-10 
(discussing the costs of police misconduct for several municipalities and communities), http://charleshamiltonhouston.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Independent-Lens-Cvr-Guts.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ6U-3AVM]; see also Shaun King, 
Cash-strapped Chicago Has Paid Half a Billion Dollars in Police Brutality Settlements Since 2004, DAILY KOS (Apr. 27, 
2015, 12:27PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/04/27/1380655/-Cash-strapped-Chicago-admits-it-has-paid-half-a-
billion-in-police-brutality-settlements-since-2004 [https://perma.cc/X9WT-2XTV] (discussing Chicago’s admission that it 
has over $521 million in settlements and legal fees related to police misconduct over the past 10 years); cf. TOCH, supra
note 27, at 72 (noting that when Oakland abolished the peer review panels and program “the result was extremely 
expensive,” including a $10 million settlement regarding police brutality complaints). 
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